https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/ Disaster Message Service Discussion Board en-US Thu, 30 Apr 2026 16:53:53 +0000 wpForo 60 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25920 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 23:30:00 +0000 Second Chechen War igor https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25920 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25919 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:59:00 +0000

The military think the graves belong to the rebels killed on Sunday as a result of the federal aviation and artillery strikes, the spokesman told the Military News Agency.


According to him, the airborne strikes alone eliminated four guerrilla strongholds in the Nozhai-Yurt district, a mounted separatist gang near the village of Dattakh and a camp in the vicinity of Tsa-Vedeno (Vedeno district). The strikes were triggered by ground reconnaissance troops.]]> Second Chechen War dimitri https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25919 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25918 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:35:00 +0000 Second Chechen War gonzo https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25918 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25917 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:24:00 +0000 Second Chechen War gonzo https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25917 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25916 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:19:00 +0000 Second Chechen War igor https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/4/#post-25916 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25915 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:10:00 +0000 Second Chechen War gonzo https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25915 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25914 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:08:00 +0000



By JUDITH INGRAM, Associated Press

MOSCOW (June 23, 2000 11:32 a.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com) - Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev rejected U.S. assurances about the American missile defense shield, claiming that the planned program was intended to give the United States the ability to strike first and destroy whatever missiles Russia launched in response.

In an interview published Friday, Sergeyev said that some U.S. officials had the "delusion" that the missile defense shield and future arms control agreements would allow the United States "to destroy Russia's strategic nuclear potential by a pre-emptive strike and interception of the remaining Russian missiles and warheads."

The United States has insisted the missile shield would pose no threat to Russia. Instead, proponents say it is necessary to protect the United States against attacks by countries such as North Korea and Iran, which could potentially develop nuclear arms capability within the next five years.

Russia adamantly opposes the system, saying it would undermine the foundation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed that the United States, NATO and Russia develop a joint missile defense system as an alternative, but he has yet to offer technical details.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is planning a test of the proposed system on July 7 with a planned interception of a missile over the Pacific Ocean. Even if it fails, Defense Secretary William Cohen has said he might recommend development of a system.

Sergeyev heaped scorn on the U.S. arguments.

"The true reasons for the missile shield deployment are not in alleged threats from rogue nations," he said in the interview with the Independent Military Review.

"Apparently, some people in the United States have been trying to obtain strategic domination by achieving a technological edge over the rest of the world and creating exclusive conditions of invulnerability, thus implementing . . . 'Fortress America.' "

Sergeyev said that the system, which is supposed to include radars, spy satellites and a limited number of missiles, could be beefed up easily with the addition of more missiles.

Its location in Alaska would allow the United States to intercept Russian missiles launched from any area of Russia or from Russian submarines, he warned.

"Such a comprehensive defense system will be primarily aimed against the deterrent potential of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Experts from the Russian Defense Ministry have no doubt about that," he said.

U.S. and Russian military officials are to continue talks on the missile shield and other defense issues on Saturday in Solnechnogorsk, outside Moscow. The delegations will be headed by Gen. Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, and Edward Warner III, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction.

The two sides will discuss a range of military issues, including the U.S. proposal to amend the ABM treaty and Putin's proposal for a joint European missile defense, officials said.]]> Second Chechen War igor https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25914 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25913 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:05:00 +0000
______________________________
ohh! That Illinois crack must be good! But you obviously haven't tried Afgan hashish yet! I've tried some and a minute after I was so damn sure that FSB and General Troshev himself wanted to sell me to dumbfucked *urka in exchange for some dancing lessons!

..ya freakin' board clown, go catch up with Barney's, maybe you'll find a bullshetting pig like yourself there, who'd believe your moronic hypothesis.]]> Second Chechen War dimitri https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25913 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25912 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 21:00:00 +0000 The remedy on this "over-reliance" is a massive increase in international governance over the sale of natural resources, and a reduction in national sovereignty. The report proposes the following five remedies:

Diversify the economy away from dependence upon primary commodities.
Read; let us decide your economic policies.
Secondly, make looting rebels unpopular by transparently using the revenue from primary commodity exports to fund effective basic services such as primary education and rural health clinics.
Let us decide how you spend your money.
Third, enlisting the international community to make it more difficult for rebel groups to sell diamonds and other commodities which they loot.
Let us decide to whom you sell.
Fourth, generate rapid growth to counter the effects of low income and economic decline.
I said, let us decide your economic policies.
Fifth, provide credible guarantees to protect minorities in societies where a single ethnic group dominates by entrenching their rights into a national constitution.
Now that you have let us play with your economy, let us decide your political arrangements.
This is a rationale for a new imperialism, which can be sold on the most humanitarian grounds. While it was clear that the Gulf War was about Western control of oil, all future wars over resources can be justified because it is for the people. Who can be callous enough to argue against that?]]> Second Chechen War igor https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25912 https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25911 Mon, 26 Jun 2000 20:54:00 +0000 26 June 2000

Summary

Governments in both the United States and Europe have suddenly signaled shifts in their stances towards Yugoslavia. Washington has suggested that rifts can be mended if Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic departs and the European Union has said that trade might resume as long as the Belgrade government doesn't get the revenues. A year after the war for Kosovo ended, the West is searching for ways to recast its strategy in the Balkans, even if means finding compromise with a leader it only recently reviled.

Analysis

It has now been a year since the war in Kosovo ended and two important trial balloons were floated last week, designed to create some room for maneuver. The Clinton administration has floated a plausibly deniable idea for giving Milosevic de facto amnesty if he leaves Yugoslavia, and the European Union announced it would create a "White List" of Yugoslav companies allowed to trade with the EU as exceptions to the general embargo.

Having failed to overthrow Milosevic with the help of the opposition, the West is now trying to generate a palace coup, providing Milosevic with incentives to leave and other members of the regime with incentives to push him out. Giving Milosevic a kind of amnesty is not a very palatable strategy, but changing geopolitical realities are forcing the United States to search for an exit strategy from Kosovo in particular, and the Balkans in general.

Overthrowing Milosevic was built into the rationale for last year's war. The United States and its NATO allies claimed that the war had to be waged for moral reasons. The United States and NATO charged that Yugoslavia was engaged in deliberate and horrendous crimes in Kosovo, described as the worst in Europe since Hitler. Therefore, the war had two goals: to expel Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, putting a halt to the atrocities and destroying the Milosevic regime by bringing those responsible for these crimes to justice. It was assumed, without much analysis, that defeat in Kosovo would inevitably topple the Milosevic government.

As in Iraq, nothing of the sort has happened. There were never more than two ways to topple Milosevic and neither depended on hauling war criminals to the Hague. One realistic option was the scenario Germany had pursued in World War II, invading via Hungary, allowing NATO to occupy Serbia, drive to Belgrade and dig the Yugoslav leader out. NATO had neither the forces in place nor the stomach for a full-scale war. Again, as with Iraq, it was easy to draw arrows on a map. It was much more difficult to deploy, supply and execute. The second realistic option was pursuing a political campaign of destabilizing the regime by supporting its opponents. This was certainly attempted and it also failed.

The failure to dislodge Milosevic has been rooted in several causes. Perhaps the most important was that the war was genuinely popular in Serbia. There was a consensus that Kosovo was an integral and critical part of Serbia. More important, Serbs believed that they were being deliberately victimized by NATO. They believed-and still believe-that the claims of mass murder were deliberate fabrications by the Albanians and the West to justify the war. Every day Serbs saw themselves as innocent victims of massive international aggression, generating both defiance and pride.

After the war, Milosevic was not personally all that popular; he was regarded by many as a bungler. However, whatever doubts the Serbs may have had, they had much graver doubts about his opposition. Milosevic may have been a bungler, but he was certainly a patriot. His opponents were seen as, at best, taking advantage of Serbia's plight to enhance their position. At worst, they were seen as agents of NATO, seeking to finish what the bombers had begun. Thus, NATO's post-war strategy was doomed by its very nature.

What has unfolded since has been a year of gridlock. In Kosovo, the occupation has become increasingly difficult. NATO forces are caught between the ambitions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and a growing willingness among Serbs to take risks. NATO troops are, in a way, hostage to the political intentions of bitter enemies.

But the gridlock in the Balkans has encountered the dynamics of a dramatically evolving global set of geopolitics. Partly because of the war in Kosovo, relations between the United States and Russia, as well as China, deteriorated. Most important, the United States faced a potential military challenge by China over Taiwan. As tension in the Taiwan Strait rose and fell, it has become increasingly apparent to U.S. policy makers that the current global disposition of U.S. forces makes little sense; occupying Kosovo, Bosnia, and patrolling the Persian Gulf makes a rapid and decisive intervention in the strait difficult. As well, the new government in Russia is in part a reaction to Russia's treatment at the hands of the West. With President Vladimir Putin skillfully splitting Europe from the U.S. over the issue of missile defenses, it would be helpful to reach a settlement in the Balkans.

The United States clearly needs to withdraw from the Balkans. But finding a way out means negotiating with Belgrade; the problem is negotiating as long as Milosevic is in power. It is the same problem that exists with Saddam Hussein. If your opponent is an immoral monster, what do you do when you can't destroy him? You can't ignore him and you can't negotiate with him. It was in this context that the Clinton administration floated an idea in the New York Times earlier this week.

The idea was simple: the Clinton administration would be willing to forgo a war crimes trial for Milosevic if he stepped down and left the country. To sweeten the deal, the administration would allow Milosevic to keep his fortune. It was floated in such a way that the administration could immediately deny it. The article had three intended audiences. The first, of course, was Milosevic. The second was the human rights apparatus, ranging from the Hague tribunal to Amnesty International. The administration wanted to test, with plausible deniability built in, how nasty the response would be from that quarter and whether it could be managed. The response from this quarter appears manageable.

The third audience, and by far the most important, is the set of powerful figures inside of the Milosevic regime. What they see is that United States is no longer committed to the destruction of the regime. It is interesting to note that at about the same time that the administration floated its trial balloon, the European Union announced the creation of a "White List" of Yugoslav firms that would be allowed to trade with the EU, as long as revenues don't go to the government in Belgrade. This is a critical signal: the union now prepared to make distinctions between good Yugoslav businesses and bad ones -- good members of the Yugoslav elite and bad.

All in all, this is an attractive offer to the Yugoslav government, basically saying that if it is rid of Milosevic, the regime can be purified and readmitted to Europe. A deal along these lines may not, however, be particularly attractive to Milosevic. The example of Pinochet rests before him. How can he be sure that some country or other won't extradite him and put him on trial while he is passing through London some day? Milosevic may not buy it.

But the United States is trying to create an opportunity that Milosevic can't resist. Other members of the regime can see an opportunity to save themselves and end the country's isolation. It also plays well to the Serb public who have no great love of Milosevic but resist the West dictating their internal politics. A move against Milosevic from within would now essentially be a palace coup, perhaps originating in the army. It is also reasonable to believe that more intimate discussions between intermediaries and Serbian elites will be aimed at getting Milosevic to buy into the deal on a personal level.

Where that leaves Kosovo is anyone's guess. It is impossible to imagine a quick return to Serbian sovereignty -- and it is impossible to imagine any Serb politician prepared to formally abandon claims to a Serbian province. There is also the question of the KLA. Who will control the former rebels? We expect a reconstituted peacekeeping force, heavily European but including Russians in a leading role. That would allow the U.S. to draw down its presence, while placating Moscow. Such a bargain would also remove Kosovo as a potential presidential campaign issue in the United States.

Of course Milosevic is fully aware of the importance of his quiet departure. Knowing that, he will extract everything he can and perhaps seek more than Washington can give him. Washington and NATO will want to do everything informally, maintaining the myth that they are not dealing with Milosevic; in the wake of the Pinochet affair, Milosevic would be a fool to settle for that. The deal may founder as a result unless his friends in Belgrade decide to push Milosevic out. Launching that sort of thinking in Belgrade was what last week's maneuvers were all about]]> Second Chechen War igor https://www.viexpo.com/second-chechen-war/archive-through-june-26-2000/paged/3/#post-25911